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THE INTERACTION OF FEDERAL EQUITABLE REMEDIES WITH STATE
SOVEREIGNTY-Puget Sound Gillnetters Association v. Moos, 88
Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
The Washington Supreme Court held in Puget Sound Gillnetters
Association v. Moos' that the State Director of Fisheries did not have
authority to issue regulations required by a federal court order guar-
anteeing treaty Indians the opportunity to catch specific percentages
of various salmon runs. After attempting to act in the face of conflict-
ing interpretations of his powers,2 the Director eventually bowed to
the state court's determination and refused to promulgate the regula-
tions.3 To implement its order, the federal court assumed control of
the Washington salmon fisheries.4
This conflict between the federal and state court decisions raises
two general questions. The first involves the validity of state-imposed
limitations on the power of state officers which interfere with the en-
forcement and protection of federal rights.5 The second involves the
scope of the federal judiciary's power to order state officers to per-
form affirmative acts.
I. BACKGROUND AND HOLDING OF PUGET SOUND
Beginning in 1854, the territorial governor of Washington negoti-
ated a series of treaties with various Indian tribes of the area.6 In
virtually identical language, the treaties provide that "[t] he right of
taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is fur-
l. 88 Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
2. The federal decision ordering allocation of the salmon is United States v. Wash-
ington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). The district court implicitly held that the Director had the
authority to so allocate. See 384 F. Supp. at 399-420. The Puget Sound court explicitly
held that he did not. 88 Wn. 2d at 692-93, 565 P.2d at 1159.
3. The Seattle Times, Oct. 8, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 5.
4. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 17, 1977) (pre-
liminary injunction order removing fish allocation from state control), aff'd sub nom.
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n. v. District Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
5. Throughout this note, "federal right" will refer to a right granted or guaranteed
under the Constitution, a federal statute, or a treaty.
6. Treaty with the Quinault & Quillehute Indians (Treaty of Olympia), July 1, 1855,
Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971 (1859); Treaty with the Makah Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat.
939 (1859); Treaty of Point No Point, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 (1859); Treaty of
Point Elliot, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (1859); Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26,
1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854).
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ther secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the terri-
tory."7 The question of the scope of these fishing rights has spawned a
long, complex, and often bitter controversy within Washington. 8 The
United States Supreme Court has yet to interpret definitively the
scope of the Indians' treaty rights, 9 leaving that task to state and lower
federal courts. The result has been a morass of ambiguous and con-
flicting court interpretations.
Washington courts have consistently held that the "in common"
clause guarantees treaty fishers the same opportunity to fish as that
held by nontreaty fishers. In other words, treaty fishers were promised
that they would not be discriminated against.' 0 In United States v.
Washington,"l however, a federal district court reached a different re-
sult, holding that the "in common" clause guarantees treaty fishers the
opportunity to catch one-half of the harvestable salmon.' 2 The Direc-
tor of Fisheries was ordered to allocate the salmon between treaty and
nontreaty fishers under a framework designed by the court.' 3 This
drastically reduced the number of fish available to an already over-
crowded commercial and sport fishing industry, resulting in severe
economic injury to nontreaty fishers14 and vocal opposition to the
federal court decision.' 5
7. Treaty of Medicine Creek, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1133 (1854) (emphasis added).
8. See generally AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CONTRO-
VERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS. 72-
106(1970).
9. See Puget Sound, 88 Wn. 2d at 697-98, 565 P.2d at 1161 (Stafford, J.. concur-
ring).
10. See, e.g., Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 86 Wn. 2d 664. 676-79.
548 P.2d 1058, 1067-69 (1976). Treaty fishers argued that this interpretation made
meaningless their "special fishing rights." The federal government apparently agreed.
for in 1970, acting as trustee for the tribes, it filed suit against Washington, seeking de-
claratory relief to define the scope of the treaty rights and injunctive relief to protect the
rights as established. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 327.
11. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
12. 384 F. Supp. at 343.
13. Id. at 414-18. The district court granted injunctive relief of both mandatory and
prohibitory form. Mandatory injunctions require a person to perform certain affirma-
tive acts, while prohibitory or negative injunctions bar a person from performing cer-
tain acts. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10, at 105 (1973).
The negative injunction issued in United States v. Washington barred the Director of
Fisheries from enforcing certain fishing regulations against treaty fishers. 384 F. Supp.
at 414-18. This portion of the federal court's order was not challenged in Puget Sound.
The challenged portion of the order required the Director to regulate fishing times to
insure that treaty fishers were given the opportunity to catch 50% of the harvestable
portion of each run.
14. See Puget Sound, 88 Wn. 2d at 692, 565 P.2d at 1158.
15. See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126,
1128-29 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d at 693 (Burns, J.. con-
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To prevent the implementation of United States v. Washington, the
Puget Sound Gillnetters Association petitioned the Washington Su-
preme Court for a writ of mandamus barring the Director from allo-
cating salmon between treaty and nontreaty fishers as required by the
federal court order. 16 By a five to three majority, the court denied the
writ, although it upheld the substance of the Association's challenge.' 7
The court held that
(1) the determination of the scope of the Director's powers is
"solely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state courts"; 8
(2) the Director is statutorily proscribed from allocating salmon for
reasons other than conservation; 19 and
(3) the federal district court cannot order the Director to perform
affirmative acts which the state courts have determined are beyond his
authority.20
In short, the court held that the state, through its Department of Fish-
eries, could not be required to enforce the federal court decision. 21
This note considers whether state limitations on the authority of
state officers necessarily bar compliance with a valid federal court or-
der. Primary emphasis is given to the scope of the equitable powers of
federal courts to remedy a denial of federal rights.22 The note con-
cludes that state limitations do not pose an absolute bar to compliance
curring). District Court Judge George Boldt, who decided United States v. Washington,
has personally borne the brunt of local criticism. At one point, he was hung in effigy on
the steps of his courthouse. The Seattle Times, March 17, 1974, § D, at 8, col. 3.
16. The Washington constitution grants original jurisdiction to the state supreme
court in proceedings for mandamus against state officers. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Mandamus usually applies only to order affirmative acts of an official. D. DOBBS, supra
note 13, at 112. Under Washington law, the writ is also available to bar performance of
a given act. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Yelle, 51 Wn. 2d 620, 320 P.2d 1086 (1958).
17. The court denied the writ because of the Department of Fisheries' "evident good
faith" and the "uniqueness of its position." 88 Wn. 2d at 680, 565 P.2d at 1152. The
court held that the Director was not authorized to comply with the district court's order,
id. at 692-93, 565 P.2d at 1159, and expressed "full confidence that the Director will
abide by our decision." Id. at 680, 565 P.2d at 1152.
18. Id. at 689, 565 P.2d at 1157.
19. Id. at 680-83, 565 P.2d at 1153-54. The court also suggested that compliance
would violate both the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the
United States Constitution. Id. See note 29 infra.
20. 88 Wn. 2d at 689, 565 P.2d at 1157.
21. Petitioners conceded that the correctness of the decision in United States v.
Washington was not at issue. Id. at 693, 565 P.2d at 1159 (Horowitz, J., concurring).
The court nevertheless analyzed the treaties, arriving at an interpretation at odds with
that of the district court. See note 29 infra.
22. It should be emphasized that this note does not discuss any aspect of the merits
of the fishing rights controversy, particularly the substance of the conflicting treaty in-
terpretations. For an article examining both United States v. Washington and Indian
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with a federal court order, and that the remedy formulated by the dis-
trict court was proper.
II. THE PUGET SOUND COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Determination of the Powers of the Director of Fisheries
"The judicial determination of the extent of a state official's au-
thority to act is solely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
state courts." 23 The implication of this statement from the Puget
Sound opinion is that the extent of the Director's powers is purely a
question of state law, upon which the state court's determination is fi-
nal.24 Although the court did not further discuss the issue, as a general
proposition its statement holds true. State officers are, after all, crea-
tures of state law. Since the source of their authority is the state, the
extent of that authority should ordinarily be a question of state law. 25
fishing rights in general, see Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation
Fishing Rights: A Case Study, 51 WASH. L. REv. 61 (1976).
A significant question beyond the scope of this note is whether the state was a suffi-
ciently adverse party to adequately present arguments in favor of protecting the judg-
ment in United States v. Washington-particularly since the district court ruled largely
against the state in that case. See Brief in Response to Application for Writ of Man-
damus, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
"At the outset, it must be known that Fisheries and the undersigned counsel do not
believe some of [their] arguments to be correct on the law," id. at 2-3, and "[a] gain.
Fisheries remains hopeful that some of these issues may be argued with more conviction
by the tribes and the United States Government than can be done by Fisheries here." Id.
at 3-4. The purpose of these quotations is not to suggest collusion or bad faith on the
part of the state-indeed, it repeatedly requested the United States and the tribes to par-
ticipate in Puget Sound-rather, they are included to raise a jurisprudential problem
which arises in this kind of case.
Another question presented by Puget Sound, but not examined in this note, is whether
the state courts can be estopped from denying the power of the Director as defined by
United States v. Washington. The state was a party to that action, and litigated to the
United States Supreme Court. Arguably the district court's holding should be binding
on the state's judicial branch. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma. 357 U.S.
320, 340 (1958) (decision binding on state, all its agencies, and all citizens). Cf. West
Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951) (state supreme court holding of a lack
of power in state officials to comply with an interstate compact was ineffective to bar
compliance with the compact).
Lastly, whether the state court's interpretation of the Director's powers was proper is
not considered.
23. Puget Sound, 88 Wn. 2d at 689, 565 P.2d at 1157.
24. The majority supports this proposition by reference to Boal v. Metropolitan
Museum of Art, 19 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1927). Boal involved conflicting decisions by state
and federal courts as to the validity of a will. The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held the state court's determination of this question to be binding on the federal
courts.
25. The flaw in this argument is that the court in United States v. Washington held
that exercise of the powers led to the denial of a federal right. See Part l11-A infra. Fur-
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In defining the Director's authority, the court first considered those
acts which the Director is empowered to perform. It concluded that a
statute which required the Department of Fisheries to "preserve, pro-
tect [and] perpetuate ... the food fish"26 authorized the Director to
act for conservation purposes only, and therefore regulations
promulgated for purposes other than conservation exceeded the Di-
rector's authority and were void.27
The court viewed the regulations required by United States v.
Washington as doubly repugnant: first, the court held that their pur-
pose was not conservation; 28 and second, the regulations were found
thermore, it assumes that all duties of state officers arise under state law. While this is
generally true, state officials also have a duty to uphold the federal constitution. U.S.
CONsT. art. VI. See Part Ill-B infra.
26. R.C.W. § 75.08.012 (1976). The court analogized to Hartman v. State Game
Comm'n, 85 Wn. 2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1976), in which the court interpreted the state
Department of Game's authority under R.C.W. § 77.12.010 (1976). That statute pro-
vides, "The game animals ... and game fish shall be preserved, protected, and perpetu-
ated, and to that end such game animals and game fish shall not be taken at such times
or places, by such means, in such manner, or in such quantities as will impair the supply
thereof." (emphasis added). Hartman held this statute limits the authority of the Depart-
ment of Game to regulate solely for conservation. The case involved a regulation
banning whitefish and steelhead trout fishing from motorized boats. The court found the
regulation's purpose was to ease tensions between on-shore fishers and those in boats,
not to effect conservation. Therefore the court struck the regulation as beyond the De-
partment's authority.
Justice Rosellini's Puget Sound opinion also relied on the following portions of
R.C.W. § 75.12.010 (1976):
[S] ubject to such seasons and regulations as may be established from time to time
by the director, it shall be lawful to fish for commercial purposes [at specific
times].
and
That whenever the director determines that a stock or run of salmon cannot be
feasibly and properly harvested in the usual manner, and that such stock or run of
salmon may be in danger of being wasted and surplus to natural or artificial
spawning requirements, the director may maneuver units of lawful gill net and
purse seine gear in any number or equivalents at his discretion, by time and area,
to fully utilize such harvestable portions of these salmon runsfor the economic well
being of the citizens of this state ....
(emphasis added). The court viewed this section as removing the Director's discretion:
once he determines the existence of surplus salmon, he is required by the statute to "ma-
neuver units of lawful gill net and purse seine gear" to harvest those fish. 88 Wn. 2d at
682, 565 P.2d at 1153. The court equated "the economic well-being and stability of the
comniercial fishing industry" with "conservation." Id. at 682-83, 565 P.2d at 1154.
For an interpretation of the Director's powers consistent with that of the district
court's, see Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson,
89 Wn. 2d 276, 300-04, 571 P.2d 1373, 1386-88 (1977) (Utter, J., dissenting).
27. 88 Wn. 2d at 683, 565 P.2d at 1154.
28. Id. at 692, 565 P.2d at 1159. See also Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wn. 2d at 278, 571 P.2d at 1374-75 (quoting testi-
mony of the Director stating that the regulations were to make more fish available to the
treaty fishers).
It has been argued, however, that the regulations the Director was ordered to promul-
gate pursuant to United States v. Washington are for conservation purposes. This analy-
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to require the Director to distinguish unconstitutionally "between
fishermen based upon their race or ethnic background." 29 These de-
terminations led the Puget Sound court to conclude that the federal
district court's mandatory injunction required acts that were beyond
the Director's power.
B. The Power of Federal Courts To Compel Acts By State Officials
The Puget Sound court stated that "a federal court will not compel
governmental officers to do any act which they are not authorized to
do by the laws of the state from which they derive their power." 30 In
supporting this assertion, the court first cited several cases in which
the Supreme Court had affirmed denials of writs of mandamus against
sis assumes that United States %'. Washington provides an allocation framework, within
which the Director may regulate for conservation purposes. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 87 Wn. 2d 417, 423-24. 553
P.2d 113, 117 (1976) (Utter, J., dissenting).
29. 88 Wn. 2d at 684, 565 P.2d at 1154. On the basis of this conflict, the Washington
Supreme Court subsequently held the interpretation in United States v. Washington un-
constitutional. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollef-
son, 89 Wn.2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977). The Passenger court held that the allocation
of 50% of the salmon to the small number of treaty fishers violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 285-86, 571 P.2d at 1378. The court, in or-
der to reach this result, grouped treaty and nontreaty fishers into the same class of
resource users, despite the treaty rights of the former group. It implied that to do other-
wise would require improper distinctions based on race or ancestry. Id. at 281, 571 P.2d
at 1376.
Weaknesses in this analysis make the court's conclusion suspect. First, the distinction
between treaty and nontreaty fishers is based on the existence of rights reserved in a
quid pro quo exchange rather than based on race. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371, 381 (1905); Passenger, 89 Wn. 2d at 289-90, 571 P.2d at 1380-81 (Utter, J., dis-
senting). Secondly, even if the distinction were based on race, recent decisions hold that
this is not necessarily improper. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541-45
(1973) (preferences for Indians in Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring practices acceptable).
It is implicit in the Constitution that state courts will interpret federal law. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 340-42 (1816). Thus the Washington court has
the power to construe the treaty rights involved here if the question is properly before it.
While a state court is bound by a United States Supreme Court determination of federal
law, there is little case law to the effect that a state court is similarly bound by the deter-
mination of a lower federal court. In a case of conflicting judgments the federal courts
are empowered to enjoin both the state court proceedings and the state courts' enforce-
ment of their judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). Where a state court is asked to defer
to lower federal court decisions on the basis of stare decisis, however, state courts have
usually considered federal authority as persuasive, but not binding, precedent. See, e.g.,
York v. Gaasland Co., 41 Wn. 2d 540, 547, 250 P.2d 967, 971 (1952).
Subsequent to the Paget Sound decision, the federal court assumed control over the
fishing seasons for salmon. It chose not to enjoin enforcement of Paget Sound or to co-
erce the Director to comply with its injunction against him. See note 4 supra and notes
87-89 and accompanying text infra.
30. 88 Wn. 2d at 684, 565 P.2d at 1155.
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state officers.31 In each case, the act sought to be compelled was be-
yond the scope of the state official's duties, and the Court refused to
impose new duties upon the official.32
The Puget Sound court next extended its assertion of limited
federal equitable power to cases involving, as here, mandatory
injunctions.33 Among the cases cited, 34 the most recent, Rizzo v.
31. Missouri ex rel. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 170 U.S. 78 (1898); United
States v. County of Clark, 95 U.S. (5 Otto.) 769 (1878); Supervisors v. United States, 85
U.S. (i8 Wall.) 71 (1873).
32. In Missouri ex rel. Laclede Gaslight Co. v. Murphy, 170 U.S. 78 (1898), a
company's charter allowed it to lay gas lines without a permit. The lower court held that
the charter did not also allow it to lay electrical lines without a permit. The Supreme
Court agreed, and held that mandamus did not lie to compel issuance of a permit until
the plaintiff met the statutory requirements therefor.
United States v. County of Clark, 95 U.S. (5 Otto.) 769 (1878), involved an attempt
to collect interest on bonds for the period between the issue date on the face of the bond
and the actual date of issue. Under state law, no interest was owed. In the absence of a
duty to pay, the Court refused to mandate that the county levy additional taxes to pay
the interest.
The Court held in Supervisors v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 71 (1873), that a
county board could not be compelled to levy increased taxes to accelerate payment of a
judgment in the face of a statutory ceiling on tax rates.
It should be noted that none of these cases involved a violation of federal right. Mur-
phy noted the absence of any federal question, 170 U.S. at 99, while Supervisors indi-
cated that the presence of a federal question might change the result reached therein, 85
U.S. at 82 (referring to impairing the obligations of contracts). Furthermore, theories of
federal equity have changed substantially since 1898. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (federal court ordering state officials to perform affirmative
acts); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (injunction prohibiting state officials from
enforcing state statute). Reliance on earlier cases is thus tenuous.
33. Analogy to mandamus, while perhaps instructive, did not resolve the issue of the
propriety of the district court's injunction. Mandamus originated at common law as an
extraordinary writ. It was subject to great discretion in its use, and could only be di-
rected against governmental officials. D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 112. Mandatory in-junctions arose at equity and are subject to less stringent tests. See generally id. § 2.10.
The propriety of the invocation of injunctive relief, as opposed to the propriety of the
scope of that relief, was not challenged in Puget Sound. See note 13 supra.
34. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, (1976); Bradley v. School Bd., 51 F.R.D. 139
(E.D. Va. 1970); Wright v. County School Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970).
In Bradley, school board members facing a possible multi-district desegregation plan
sought joinder of board members from the other districts. The court granted joinder,
noting the defendants were powerless to comply with an injunction requiring them to
exercise authority over the other districts. 51 F.R.D. at 142-43.
The Puget Sound court quotes dictum from Wright stating that "a court will only or-
der a public official to perform ... acts which are within the powers conferred upon him
by law [citing case], and will deny relief when those before it are not fully empowered,
under state law, to take the action requested." 309 F. Supp. at 677. Wright involved a
city's attempt to cancel its school contract with a district which had been ordered to
desegregate. The city desired to start its own school system. The court denied the city
permission to do so, on the ground that it might interfere with the desegregation plan.
The quoted statement arose in answer to the question of whether officials of the former
district would be authorized to implement the federal court order in the new school sys-
tem. The court opined that they would not, but noted that the city school officials would
be bound to implement the plan in any event. Id. at 676-77.
It is important to note that in both of these cases, some official would be empowered
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Goode,35 is most directly concerned with the scope of federal equity.
Rizzo involved a broad injunction directed towards the Philadelphia
Police Department and aimed at halting an alleged pattern of police
brutality against minority citizens. 36 The United States Supreme
Court reversed for want of an adequate controversy between plaintiffs
and defendant police officials.37 In dictum, however, Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion presented a broad discussion of the federal
judiciary's equitable powers. When a remedy is necessarily directed
towards a state or its officers, framing that remedy requires that the
interest in protecting the federal right be balanced against the interest
of state sovereignty. 38 Rizzo involved only a minimal showing of con-
stitutional violations, 39 and no showing of violations or encourage-
ment thereof by defendants. 40 Balancing this against the district
court's extreme intrusion "into the internal disciplinary affairs of [the
police department] ,"41 the Court found that the state interest in local
control should prevail.42 Although the Puget Sound court did not ex-
pressly so state, the inference to be drawn is that the intrusion in
United States v. Washington was similarly too extreme. 43
to comply with the district court's order. Thus, in neither case did the holding that the of-
ficial's powers were limited by state law result in the denial of a federal right. Further,
in both cases the lack of authority was founded on geographical jurisdictional criteria as
opposed to a narrow interpretation of the powers of a statewide official with statewide
powers.
35. 423 U.S. 362(1976).
36. After finding evidence of police brutality, Council of Organizations on Phila-
delphia Police v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the district court or-
dered police officials to formulate new procedures for filing and processing complaints
of brutality, including the formation of a citizens' board of review and the revision of
police manuals with respect to interaction with minority community members. Id. at
1321.
37. 423 U.S. at 371-73. None of the police officers who had allegedly participated
in the brutality were defendants; only high police officials were before the Court. None
of these officials was alleged to have been involved in the incidents, or had been shown
to have acted in any way which would encourage such practices.
38. See 423 U.S. at 378-79.
39. Id. at 373-76.
40. Id. at 371.
41. Id. at 380.
42. Id.
43. In Puget Sound, the court quotes from the section of Rizzo in which Justice
Rehnquist reversed the order because of the intrusiveness of the district court's injunc-
tion. 88 Wn. 2d at 688-89, 565 P.2d at 1156-57. But the Supreme Court in Rizzo held
that the order was unwarranted under the facts of that case and not that every order di-
rected towards a state official violates federalism. Judging the validity of a federal court
remedy (assuming that a state court can do so) involves applying the principles of fed-
eralism to the case, balancing the state's interest in local control and discretion against
protection of the federal right. 423 U.S. at 380. The Washington court in Puget Sound
failed to either undertake this balancing test, or to explain why the order in United
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C. Summary
In brief, the Puget Sound court held that (1) it alone could deter-
mine the authority of the Director of Fisheries; (2) the Director lacked
authority to perform the acts ordered by the district court; and (3)
therefore the Director could not be bound by the district court's in-
junction. This analysis reflects misconceptions with respect to both
federal-state relationships and the scope of federal equity. The next
section examines both areas in order to dispel these misconceptions.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Limitations on the Power of the State Officials
Although there are two sources of law under the Constitution-
state and federal-social order demands that ultimately there be one
supreme law.44 The framers of the Constitution recognized the possi-
bility for conflict under a dual system and resolved the problem by
making federal law paramount. 45 The result is that the sovereignty of
states is not equivalent to the sovereignty of a nation; it is a sover-
eignty limited by the strictures of our federal system. 46 When a state
remains within the sphere of interests reserved to it, its powers are ab-
solute.47 But in the area of federal supremacy, the state's powers are
subordinate to those of the national government. 48 If a state law im-
States v. Washington is overly intrusive. See Part 11-C infra.
The district court, on the other hand, was well aware of the principles enunciated in
Rizzo. It examined the interests of both the state and the plaintiffs; in formulating its
remedy, its goal was to keep intrusion to a minimum. 384 F. Supp. at 413.
44. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824); Hart, The Re-
lations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLuM. L. REV. 489, 489 (1954) ("People
repeatedly subjected, like Pavlov's dogs, to two or more inconsistent sets of directions,
without means of resolving the inconsistencies, could not fail in the end to react as the
dogs did. The society, collectively, would suffer a nervous breakdown."). See also L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 65-70 (Rev. ed. 1969).
45. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
46. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 257, 266-67 (1879); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824).
47. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
48. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525 (1937); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 324. The denial of federal treaty rights
795
Washington Law Review Vol. 53: 787, 1978
pinges upon a federal right, the state law must defer.49
The fundamental flaw of the Puget Sound opinion is its failure to
recognize this subordination. None of the cases cited in support of the
decision dealt with the deprivation of a federal right. 50 Yet the treaty
rights asserted in United States v. Washington are federal in origin.5'
The statement that "[t] he judicial determination of a state official's
authority to act is solely and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
state courts"52 is of doubtful validity in the context of a federal court
decision that such a determination would lead to the denial of a fed-
eral right. 53 As the United States Supreme Court noted in Gomillion
v. Lightfoot,5 4
When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state inter-
est, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is
not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circum-
venting a federally protected right .... [The lack of insulation] has
long been recognized in cases which have prohibited a State from ex-
which had resulted from the Washington allocation system made the state method of reg-
ulation in part a question of federal law. See Jackson County Bd. of Comm'rs v.
United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939) (county board could be compelled to pay in-
terest on taxes unlawfully assessed against Indian lands despite state law barring such
payment; equities in case were such that payment was not ordered); Indiana ex rel. An-
derson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) (state court decision as to the existence of a con-
tract held not free from federal judicial review under a claim of impairing the
obligations of contracts).
49. This may result in invalidating the state law if it is completely repugnant to the
federal right, North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971), or
merely limiting the application of the law to the extent necessary to protect the federal
right, Jackson County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
50. See notes 25, 32, 34, & 43 supra. The Puget Sound court asserts that relief was
denied in Rizzo despite the violation of a constitutional right. 88 Wn. 2d at 688, 565
P.2d at 1156. But the reason that relief was denied was that no one before the court had
violated, or encouraged the violation of, anyone's constitutional rights. 423 U.S. at 371-
72. This contrasts with the instant case in which the regulatory practices of the state and
its Department of Fisheries were held to violate the federal treaty rights of the tribes.
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 passim (W.D. Wash. 1974).
51. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (treaty rights superseded state sover-
eignty as supreme law of the land).
52. 88 Wn. 2d at 689, 565 P.2d at 1157.
53. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). Of course, the state court
also had authority to reach its own interpretation of the treaty. See note 29 supra.
54. 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (emphasis added). Gomillion involved a change in the
municipal boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, from a rectangle to a 28-sided irregularly
shaped polygon. This change removed 99% of the city's black voters without removing a
single white. Id. at 341. The Supreme Court did not deny the power of a state to define
such boundaries, but held the power was subject to restrictions under the Constitution.
Changes aimed at excluding citizens from the voting process on the basis of race were
deemed not constitutionally permissible.
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ploiting a power acknowledged to be absolute in an isolated context to
justify the imposition of an "'unconstitutional condition."
Thus, if state officials act at all, they can be required to act in accord
with the Constitution.55 This may include imposing duties beyond
those the state requires-duties which are, in effect, federal duties.5 6
The circumstances warranting the imposition of such duties, and the
question of their scope, are examined in the following section.
B. Federal Equitable Powers
1. Mandatory injunctions may be ordered
The question whether the state can be required to implement the
decision in United States v. Washington is not completely answered
by a conclusion that the state will not be allowed to deny the fights
therein defined.57 The issue is the scope of the authority of the federal
courts to require the state to enforce the right affirmatively.
Since Ex parte Young, the power of federal courts to issue orders
against state executive officers has been clear.58 The federal judiciary,
55. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), in
which the North Carolina constitution and several state statutes barred compliance with
a federal court desegregation order. The Supreme Court brushed aside these prohibi-
tions: "[I] f a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to in-
hibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishment
of a dual school system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to hin-
der vindication of federal constitutional guarantees." Id. at 45.
It is noteworthy in this context that the Constitution requires all state officials to
swear to uphold it in the performance of their duties. U.S. CoNSr. art. VI.
56. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (statutory limi-
tations on the power of school official insufficient to bar compliance with federal court
order); Jackson County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939) (dic-
tum) (county board could be compelled to pay interest on taxes unlawfully assessed
against Indian lands, despite state law barring such payment; equities in case were such
that payment was not ordered).
57. Generally the source of a right defines the body which should enforce it. It
would follow that the federal government should ordinarily enforce federal rights. There
is clearly a difference between barring a state from violating a right (which can be con-
strued as protection by the federal government) and requiring the state to take affirma-
tive action to protect the right. It must be remembered, however, that the denial here
arises indirectly through the state's use of its police power in managing natural re-
sources. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (game animals). The state's inter-
est in local control and discretion is a significant factor in favor of state control of the
fisheries. In order to protect both the state and federal interests, it may become neces-
sary to require the state to enforce affirmatively the federal right in its regulation of the
fisheries.
58. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young involved a challenge by railroads subject to a
Minnesota rate regulation scheme. The federal court held the state plan unconstitu-
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however, has been slow to order affirmative acts of those officers be-
cause mandatory injunctions are viewed as a serious affront to state
sovereignty. 59 Yet awkward situations arise in which administrative
control and discretion are generally regarded as best left to local offi-
cials, but the refusal of those officials to act in certain ways leads to a
denial of federal rights. To preserve local sovereignty, while protect-
ing federal rights, it is necessary to provide mandatory injunctive re-
lief. It is now well settled that a federal court may order state officials
to perform affirmative acts which state law does not require, 60 or,
indeed, allow. 61
Griffin v. County School Board62 was the first major case in which
this aspect of federal equity was asserted. In an attempt to avoid the
tional and enjoined Young, Minnesota's attorney general, from enforcing it. Young
nevertheless filed an enforcement action in state court. The federal court held him in
contempt, and jailed him. On a writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court affirmed the
contempt citation, implicitly affirming the original injunction. The Court held that the
eleventh amendment's bar of citizens' suits against states did not prohibit a citizen from
seeking injunctive relief against state officers violating federal rights. A state official is
not clothed with the authority to violate the Constitution; Young's attempted enforce-
ment of the statute stripped him of his status as a representative of the state and placed
him before the Court as an individual, fully subject to its equitable powers.
59. In Young, although the Court approved use of negative injunctive relief, it sug-
gested that mandatory relief would have been improper. See Hart, supra note 44, at
515-16 (citing the eleventh amendment's bar of suits against states as a second factor
against mandatory injunctions). However, recent cases support the use of mandatory in-
junctions against state officers. See notes 60-62, & 64 and accompanying text infra.
60. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II) (district court order re-
quiring remedial programs to accompany desegregation program and to be funded by
state and local governments held a valid exercise of equitable powers); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (county could be required to reopen and fund
public schools to meet compliance with a desegregation order; state law did not require
the county to provide public schools, but the equal protection clause did); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Kansas statute allowing maintenance of segre-
gated schools did not foreclose desegregation order).
61. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (state statute
prohibiting assignment to schools on the basis-of race held an invalid impingement on
official's powers and not a bar to compliance'with federal court desegregation order);
Jackson County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 309 U.S. 343 (1939) (dictum)
(county board could be compelled to pay interest on taxes unlawfully assessed against
Indian lands, despite state law prohibiting such payment; equities in case were such that
payment was not ordered). Cf. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951),
in which West Virginia entered a compact with seven neighboring states to prevent pol-
lution of the Ohio River. A commission composed of representatives of the individual
states and the federal government was to administer the plan. After the states had rati-
fied the compact, and Congress had approved it, West Virginia's state auditor refused to
pay the state's share of the cost. The West Virginia Supreme Court held that the auditor
was correct because state law forbade payment of state funds to projects not under state
control. The United States Supreme Court reversed, requiring the auditor to pay the
funds.
62. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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implementation of Brown v. Board of Education,63 a county closed its
public schools and instituted a private system which accepted only
whites. The system was funded primarily through public tuition grants
and property tax credits. The Supreme Court affirmed a district court
order enjoining the public funding, but more important with respect
to Puget Sound, it approved an order requiring the county to reopen
the public schools and assess taxes to finance them.6 4
Since Griffin, federal courts have ordered state officials to perform
affirmative acts on numerous occasions. School desegregation cases
remain most prominent, 65 although mandatory injunctions have also
issued in cases involving legislative redistricting,66 upgrading state pe-
nal and mental institutions,67 and establishing "affirmative action"
employment programs. 68
State-imposed limitations on an official's powers have not been
viewed as a barrier to such orders. For instance, in many of the deseg-
regation cases, state law barred compliance with the federal court or-
der.69 Typical was the law before the Supreme Court in North Caro-
lina State Board of Education v. Swann:70
The legislation before us flatly forbids assignment of any student on
account of race . . . . The prohibition is absolute, and it would
inescapably operate to obstruct the remedies granted by the District
Court ....
[.. T] he flat prohibition against assignment of students for the
purpose of creating a racial balance must inevitably conflict with the
duty of school authorities to disestablish dual school systems .... An
absolute prohibition against use of such a device- even as a starting
point- contravenes the implicit command . . . that all reasonable
methods be available to formulate an effective remedy.
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. 377 U.S.-at 232-34.
65. E.g., Milliken I, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (municipality required to provide and
fund various remedial programs to effectuate district court school desegregation order).
66. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
67. Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503
F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (state prison hospital re-
quired to comply with minimum standards); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (court
set minimum standards of care and treatment for state mental institutions).
68. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff d, 403 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1974) (state highway patrol).
69. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 n.1 (1954) (laws re-
quiring segregated schools).
70. 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971).
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Once the district court's order becomes final within the federal sys-
tem, the local official becomes "clearly charged with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to [implement the or-
der] .71 This duty is federal in origin, arising from the Constitution.72
The Puget Sound court committed a dual error in this regard. First,
it assumed that affirmative duties can only be imposed by, or derived
from, state law. 73 Second, this premise led the court to conclude that
the determination of the authority of state officials is solely a question
of state law, with state courts the "sole and exclusive" determiners of
that authority.74 The cases indicate the law to be otherwise.
2. Scope and validity of the remedy afforded
Of course, a federal court may not order a specific official to per-
form any act it chooses.75 Federal equity is limited as to both the
availability and the scope of a remedy, and these limitations strike a
delicate balance between state sovereignty and the protection of fed-
eral rights.
Before injunctive relief is ordered, the facts must present a proper
case for the invocation of federal equity.76 The basic requirement is
that the remedy at law be inadequate, 77 and, in formulating its rem-
71. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); accord, Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1,7 (1958).
72. Dictum in Jackson County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343
(1939), indicates that a federal court is not precluded from ordering a county to pay in-
terest on taxes unlawfully assessed against Indian lands, despite state law to the con-
trary:
Nothing that the state can do will be allowed to destroy the federal right which is
to be vindicated .... The state will not be allowed to invade the immunities of In-
dians, no matter how skillful its legal manipulations. Nor are the federal courts
restricted to the remedies available in state courts in enforcing such federal rights.
308 U.S. at 350 (citations omitted). Because state law barred the payment of interest.
such a duty could only arise federally (in this case, created through the combined opera-
tion of the treaty-making power and the supremacy clause). The Court found that a
judgment including interest was not warranted under the facts of the case.
73. See 88 Wn. 2d at 689, 565 P.2d at 1157. See notes 24 and 25 supra.
74. 88 Wn. 2d at 688, 565 P.2d at 1157.
75. It could not, for example, order the Director of Fisheries to take over the ad-
ministration of the State Highway Department. Note, however, that the Department of
Fisheries (with the exception of one species of fish) is the sole state agency charged with
management of the fish resource. Any duty which is imposed on the state in its alloca-
tion framework must fall on the Department of Fisheries. This distinguishes many of the
cases the Paget Sound court cited. See note 34 supra.
76. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 13, §§ 2.2-.10.
77. Id. at § 2.5.
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edy, the court should consider a variety of factors. Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education78 provides three considera-
tions:
(1) There must be a violation of a federal right;79
(2) The scope of the remedy is to be determined by the nature and
extent of the violation;80 and
(3) The remedy should balance the interests of local control
against the need for protection of a federal right.81
The third factor has recently become of critical importance in deter-
mining the propriety of a given remedy82 and reflects the growing
concern for the protection of state rights which the Burger Court has
manifested in a variety of areas.83
78. 402 U.S. I (1971). The order approved in Sivann implemented the desegrega-
tion of the schools of Charlotte, North Carolina. It included a massive busing program,
as well as "pairing" inner city and suburban schools.
79. Id. at 15-16. The Swann Court spoke in terms of the violation of a
constitutional right, as distinguished from a federally guaranteed or created right. This
higher standard is due to the use of remedial equity in Swann: i.e., injunctions aimed at
redressing past wrongs and bringing plaintiffs to the position they would have occupied
but for the violation of the right. Statutory and decisional law establish that a constitu-
tional violation, as such, is not required if equity is used only to insure the future protec-
tion of the right. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1976)
(making available necessary remedies to implement rights determined under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201). In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the board of a
private park refused to allow the assignment of a share in the park to a black renter in
the development in which the park was located. Justice Douglas, writing for the major-
ity, stated that even though 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (under which the action was brought) is
couched in declaratory terms, under it "a federal court has power to fashion an effective
equitable remedy." Id. at 238. He continued, "[t] he existence of a statutory right im-
plies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." Id. at 239. Similar lan-
guage appears in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946):
[W] here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the neces-
sary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and
a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
Id. at 684 (footnotes omitted). United States v. Washington was brought under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1976). The latter provides that "necessary or proper" relief is
available once rights (or violations thereof) are established under § 2201.
80. 402 U.S. at 16. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (relief available only to redress
violation); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I) (inter-district desegre-
gation remedy unwarranted absent showing of segregation in all districts).
81. 402 U.S. at 15-16; Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
82. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380 (infrequent, scattered incidents of police brutality with-
out showing of encouragement of such activities by superiors did not justify intrusion
into the internal, disciplinary affairs of the Philadelphia Police Department); White v.
Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1972) (district court should defer to state policies whenever possi-
ble).
83. See, e.g., Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Court has also been concerned with
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C. Application to Puget Sound
United States v. Washington established that prior state regulatory
practices violated federally guaranteed treaty rights. The negative in-
junction in that case which barred the Director from enforcing certain
state laws was not challenged in Puget Sound,84 and the propriety of
invoking equitable relief was thus not at issue. But the issue remains
whether the district court properly limited the use of its equitable
powers in requiring the state to allocate salmon between treaty and
nontreaty fishers.
Theoretically there are at least four possible alternative plans for
regulating the Washington salmon fisheries: 85
Plan I. Leave regulation to the discretion of the state. This
was the method employed before United States v. Washington,
and which that case held led to a denial of treaty rights. 86
Plan II. Leave regulation to the state, subject to the federal
court order mandating division of the catch. This was the
method adopted under United States v. Washington but rejected
by the state court in Puget Sound.87
Plan III. Remove from state jurisdiction that portion of the
salmon fisheries properly allocable to the treaty fishers, but al-
congressional intrusions into state control. In National League of Cities v. Usery. 426
U.S. 833 (1976). the Court held invalid an extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
the states qua states as an unwarranted usurpation of state sovereignty and discretion.
This trend has been noted in the circuit courts. In Brown v. E.P.A., 521 F.2d 827 (9th
Cir. 1975). the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that states could not be required to
enforce federal air pollution standards under the Clean Air Act. But see Pennsylvania
v. E.P.A., 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the enforcement provisions of the Act as a valid exercise of the federal commerce
power.
84. See note 13 supra.
85. These are judicial alternatives. Of course, a nonjudicial alternative exists. Con-
gress has power to abrogate treaties. Recent attempts to abrogate the fishing rights in-
volved herein include H.R. 9054, 123 CONG. REC. H9304 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1977). and
H.R. 9950 § 207, 123 CONG. REC. H 12242 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1977).
86. Given this determination, the district court was forced to act in order to protect
the treaty rights. The Puget Sound decision itself, and decisions such as Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson. 89 Wn. 2d 276. 571
P.2d 1373 (1977), reveal the state's continued unwillingness to enforce the rights as de-
fined in United States v. Washington. See United States v. Washington. Civ. No. 9213
(W.D. Wash., Oct. 17, 1977) (preliminary injunction order) (criticizing the state and its
court for noncompliance with the decision).
87. 88 Wn. 2d at 691-92, 565 P.2d at 1158-59. Of course, it is still possible for the
district court to enjoin any state court actions against the Director which interfere with
the effectuation of its judgment or its continuing jurisdiction over the controversy. See
note 29 supra.
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low the state to regulate the remainder as it had before. This was
the method originally adopted in the aftermath of Puget Sound.88
Plan IV. Transfer total regulation to the federal government.
This is the current method of allocation following a state court
threat to bar the Department of Fisheries from complying with a
type III plan.8 9
In light of the district court's rejection of a type I plan in United
States v. Washington, and the state's continued hostility to the treaty
rights therein defined, 90 a type II plan appears preferable under the
criteria developed in Swann and Rizzo. It limits federal intervention
to a minimum, while adequately protecting treaty fishing rights. Plans
of types III and IV would remove at least part of the harvest from
state control; under a type II plan, the state would retain control over
all fish, subject to certain limitations with respect to treaty fish. State
control would remain absolute over the nontreaty portion of the har-
vest, and at least partial over the treaty portion.91 A type II plan is
also the most efficient in terms of administration, research, and en-
forcement. 92 Types III and IV require dual systems of control, while
a type II plan leaves ultimate management in one entity-the state.
88. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 31, 1977)
(memorandum order and preliminary injunction removing state jurisdiction over the
treaty portion of the fisheries).
89. The state court's suggestion was made during a preliminary hearing. Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 7, 1977, § A, at 9. The district court relied on the alleged order
in reformulating its injunction. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D.
Wash., Oct. 17, 1977) (memorandum order and preliminary injunction removing allo-
cation from state control). The state order was never formalized, however, and the case
was subsequently consolidated with another challenge by the Puget Sound Gillnetters
Association. Grays Harbor Gillnetters Ass'n v. Sandison, No. 45144 (Wash. Oct. 11,
1977) (order consolidating cases).
90. See note 86 supra.
91. The district court's control should extend only over the treaty portion of the har-
vest; even that control should be minimized. The state should retain discretion to choose
among various regulatory options within the district court's allocation guidelines. Plans
of types III and IV do not provide this local control. Plan III prevents the state from ex-
ercising any allocatory control over the treaty portion of the fisheries, while plan IV re-
moves all state allocatory control.
92. Imposing dual federal-state controls over the fisheries, as in plans III and IV, is
wasteful and awkward. The degree of cooperation required to avoid conflicting orders
in the face of constantly changing harvest projections would be so extensive as to force
the two agencies to act as one; yet the expense and waste of dual enforcement and
management would still be present. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. F.P.C., 328
U.S. 152, 171 (1945) (dual management wasteful). Further problems would be pre-
sented by the possibility of conflict in the regulatory goals and techniques of the two
agencies. If the two could not agree, it would be difficult to resolve the impasse. Fur-




The Puget Sound holding that the district court remedy was
improper is based on misconceptions and false assumptions regarding
both federal-state relations and the equitable power of federal courts.
Decisions such as Puget Sound provide a smoke screen for recalci-
trant state officials to avoid compliance with valid federal court or-
ders. 93 The Washington court's decision has resulted in an embar-
rassing situation in which a state official is subject to conflicting court
determinations of his powers and duties. Furthermore, the ultimate
result has been to leave a federal judge as the manager of Washing-
ton's fisheries. 94
Whether the federally protected right involved is the right to a
quality education for all citizens, to decent prison conditions, to equal
voting power, or to fish as guaranteed by a treaty, it is the supreme
law of the land and deserves protection. Regardless of the correctness
of United States v. Washington on the merits, it is now law; decisions
such as Puget Sound are not the proper method to attack that law.9 5
The Washington Supreme Court should re-evaluate its position and
at the next opportunity require all state officials to comply with
United States v. Washington.
Bennet A. McConaughy
York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916) (dual sovereignty by tribes and
state).
93. See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. District Court, 573 F.2d at 1126. See gen-
erally Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Court Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV.
903 (1976).
94. Usurpation of state sovereignty in this area is certainly not desirable. See notes
43 & 57 supra.
95. The words of Justice Frankfurter's classic concurring opinion in Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20, 22, 24-25 (1958) seem particularly appropriate here:
For those in authority thus to defy the law of the land is profoundly subversive not
only of our constitutional system but of the presuppositions of a democratic soci-
ety. The State "must ... yield to an authority that is paramount to the State."
Th'e duty to abstain from resistance to "the supreme Law of the Land," U.S.
Const., Art. VI, § 2 .... does not require immediate approval of it nor does it deny
the right of dissent. Criticism need not be stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is
barred.... The Constitution is not the formulation of the merely personal views of
the members of this Court, nor can its authority be reduced to the claim that state
officials are its controlling interpreters.
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